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Codification, Consolidation, Restatement? How best to systemise the modern law of tort 
Paula Giliker*  
Abstract: The law of tort (or extra or non-contractual liability) has been criticised for being imprecise and lacking 
coherence.  Legal systems have sought to systemise its rules in a number of ways.  While civil law systems 
generally place tort law in a civil code, common law systems have favoured case-law development supported by 
limited statutory intervention consolidating existing legal rules. In both systems, case-law plays a significant role 
in maintaining the flexibility and adaptability of the law.  This article will examine, comparatively, different means 
of systemising the law of tort, contrasting civil law codification (taking the example of recent French proposals 
to update the tort provisions of the Code civil) with common law statutory consolidation and case-law intervention 
(using examples taken from English and Australian law). In examining the degree to which these formal means 
of systemisation are capable of improving the accessibility, intelligibility, clarity and predictability of the law of 
tort, it will also address the role played by informal sources, be they ambitious restatements of law or other means. 
It will be argued that given the nature of tort law, at best, any form of systemisation (be it formal or informal) can 
only seek to minimise any lack of precision and coherence.  However, as this comparative study shows, further 
steps are need, both in updating out-dated codal provisions and rethinking the type of legal scholarship that might 
best assist the courts. 




The distinction between civil and common law systems has often been characterised as the 
distinction between codified and non-codified systems. De Cruz, for example, in his student 
textbook advises that ‘it is still true to say that … the primary source of law in civil law 
countries … is still predominantly codified or enacted law, whereas in common law countries 
it is still predominantly case law’. 1  As comparative lawyers know, this statement is a 
simplification, 2  based on a private law perspective with limited relevance to public and 
criminal law, but one that remains fundamentally true for the law of tort/extra-contractual 
liability. 3  Lord Hodge, for example, in 2019 described the common law of obligations as 
‘essentially judge-made’.4 In contrast, it is the Civil Code that takes centre stage in civil law 
jurisdictions such as France, where it retains “une forte charge symbolique” 5 : the rules 
applicable to la responsabilité extracontractuelle set out in arts.1240-1252.6   
 
* Professor of Comparative Law, University of Bristol (paula.giliker@bristol.ac.uk).  This paper is based on a 
keynote speech delivered at a joint session of the Comparative and Tort Law subject sections at the 2019 Society 
of Legal Scholars conference. The author would like to thank the reviewers for the ICLQ for their helpful 
comments. 
1 P de Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (3rd edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 42.  See also K Zweigert 
and H Kőtz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn, OUP 1998) 181. 
2 Albeit one helpful for those learning about comparative law or attempting to engage with civilian or common 
law legal systems for the first time. 
3 For reasons of convenience and accessibility, this article will use the common law term ‘tort law’ to signify both 
common and civil law. This should not be taken to indicate that these areas of law are identical.  
4 Lord Hodge, ‘The scope of judicial law-making in the common law tradition’, Lecture to the Max Planck 
Institute of Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg, 28 October 2019, para 3. 
5 A strong symbolic meaning: J-L Halpérin, The French Civil Code (Routledge-Cavendish 2006). See also G 
Canivet et al, Les Français et leur Code civil (Journal Officiel 2004). 
6 The provisions of the Code civil were renumbered following reforms in 2016.  Statutory additions include arts. 
1245-1245-17 implementing the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC on defective products and arts. 1246-





This article will examine how common and civil law systems have responded to claims 
that the law of tort lacks precision and coherence using the examples of English and French 
law.  Both legal systems have manifested concerns at the lack of systemisation of contemporary 
tort law. Oliphant argues that this has serious implications: ‘incoherence … in large parts of 
our law of tort is a major barrier to our communication of its key tenets and our engagement in 
debates about its future.’7  This article will therefore examine, from a comparative perspective, 
the means by which the law of tort can be rendered more accessible, intelligible and coherent.8 
It will first examine codification: the methodology favoured by the civil law legal tradition.  
Codification of tort law will be examined in the light of recent proposals by the French Ministry 
of Justice to update the codification of the French law of tort. 9  While not yet enacted due to a 
change of government in May 2017, these proposals remain under active consideration and 
highlight the potential benefits of a modern codification of tort law.  Codification here permits 
not only a period of reflection on the role of tort law in 21st society, but also gives the drafters 
the opportunity to remove dead wood, rationalise case-law developments and clarify any 
misunderstandings arising in the law.  Codification of private law is not, however, a purely 
civilian idea. Weiss points out that English lawyers have been engaged in thought about 
codification for over 200 years with a list of failed code projects including contract, criminal 
and commercial law.10 Bentham, perhaps its most well-known advocate, saw codification as a 
vital means to make the law accessible and predictable to the layperson.11  Further, the Law 
Commission Act 1965 expressly requires the Commission to contemplate codification as a 
means to systemise, modernise and simplify the law.12  Steiner has been forthright: ‘As a 
consequence of the failure to conclude any codification project, important areas of English law 
have been left in a critical condition and in real need of some form of systematisation and 
clarification.’13    
However, codification is not the sole option available.  In rejecting codification, as we 
will see, the common law has developed its own methodology, with statute playing an 
important role in consolidating case-law development.  While confused, at times, with 
codification, it is a distinct methodology providing a means of bringing greater certainty to the 
common law.  More informal options also exist: legal scholarship and, notably in the United 
States and at a European level, restatements in which a particular organisation seeks to restate 
core principles of private law. These projects have different goals –at US level to assist courts 
in a federal system by providing clearer formulations of the common law and its statutory 
 
7 K Oliphant, ‘Rationalising tort law for the 21st century’ in K Barker et al (eds), Private Law in the 21st century 
(Hart 2017) 66.   
8 ‘The law must be accessible and, so far as possible, intelligible, clear and predictable’: Lord Bingham, The Rule 
of Law (Penguin Books 2011) 37. 
9 Projet de réforme du droit de la responsabilité civile (Ministry of Justice 2017).  These followed earlier reforms 
to the contract law section of the Civil Code: Ordonnance n° 2016-131 of 10 February 2016 (ratified by loi n°2018-
287 of 20 April 2018). See, in English, S Rowan, ‘The New French Law of Contract’ (2017) 66 ICLQ 805; J 
Cartwright and S Whittaker (eds), The Code Napoléon Rewritten: French Contract Law after the 2016 Reforms 
(Hart 2017). 
10 GA Weiss, ‘The enchantment of codification in the common law world’ (2000) 25 Yale J. Int’l L 435.    See 
also SJ Stoljar, ‘Codification in the Common Law’ in SJ Stoljar (ed), Problems of Codification (ANU Press 1977). 
11 P Schofield and J Harr (eds), Jeremy Bentham, ‘Legislator of the World’ Writings on Codification, Law and 
Education (OUP 1998). 
12 s.3(1) Law Commissions Act 1965.  
13 E Steiner, ‘Challenging (again) the undemocratic form of the common law: Codification as a method of making 





elements14 and in Europe to identify a common core of European tort law principle.15 While 
not intended to serve as a model code,16 these provide more informal methods of rationalising 
the law supported by commentary and model rules.  
If we seek to improve the accessibility, intelligibility and coherence of tort law, it is 
important to examine critically the modes of systemisation used by common and civil law 
systems.  Should common lawyers reconsider codification as a means to improve existing law 
or is the current resistance to such ideas justified?  To what extent can common law 
consolidation provide a mechanism to clarify principles of tort law?  While much has been 
written about contract law, both in terms of European harmonisation and codification,17 tort 
law has so far received limited attention, despite concerns as to its coherence and accessibility. 
In this article, I will examine why tort law has proven particularly difficult to systemise, before 
examining codification, consolidation and restatements as techniques to bring greater 
coherence to the law.  It will be shown that in both common and civil law systems, there is 
room for improvement.  The very nature of tort law requires a response that accepts the need 
for both formal and informal modes of systemisation.  More needs to be done. 
  
II. TORT LAW AND UNCERTAINTY: A PROBLEM?  
Before examining the mechanisms used by common and civil law to systemise private law, it 
is helpful to identify first why the accessibility, intelligibility and coherence of the law of tort 
are regarded as such a problem.  One factor all systems of tort law have to face is that parts of 
tort law are inherently indeterminate.  Tort law, as a law of civil wrongs, must adapt to changing 
circumstances and reflect the values and norms of a particular society. Too rigid a system would 
not be able to respond to contemporary needs and economic, social and technological change.  
Many tort law concepts such as ‘fault’, ‘reasonableness’, even ‘causation’ or ‘harm’ are 
therefore relative – relative to the standards set by a particular society, judicial determination 
of the scope of liability and to the facts of the particular case. Liability for negligence, for 
example, requires proof of behaviour that falls below the standard expected of a ‘reasonable’ 
person. Ultimately, if we are trying to assess how the reasonable person would behave,18 this 
 
14  See J Stapleton, ‘Controlling the future of the common law by restatement’ in M Stuart Madden (ed), Exploring 
Tort Law (CUP 2005) 263-265 and, classically, L Green, ‘The Torts Restatement’ 29 Ill. L. Rev. 582 (1934-1935). 
15 See M Bussani and M Infantino, ‘Harmonisation of tort law in Europe’ in A Marciano and GB Ramello (eds), 
Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics (Springer 2014); M Infantino, ‘Making European tort law: the game and 
its players’ 18 Cardozo J Int Comp Law 45 (2010). 
16 Although some doubts have been expressed on this at European level, see N Jansen and R Zimmermann, ‘A 
European Civil Code in all but name’ (2010) 69 CLJ 98, commenting on the European Commission’s Draft 
Common Frame of Reference Project: C von Bar and E Clive (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of 
European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) (OUP 2010), Book VI of which covered non-
contractual liability arising out of damage caused to another.  More generally, see M Hesselink (ed), The Politics 
of a European Civil Code (Kluwer Law International 2006). 
17 The literature is voluminous: in 2020 alone, on European harmonisation see e.g. M Hesselink, An Introduction 
to European Contract Law (Hart 2020); R Zimmermann, ‘The Significance of the Principles of European Contract 
Law’ (2020) 28 ERPL 487. On codification of common law contract and commercial law, see A Tettenborn, 
‘Codifying Contracts—An Idea Whose Time has Come?’ (2014) 67 CLP 273; W Swain, ‘Contract Codification 
in Australia: Is It Necessary, Desirable and Possible?’ (2014) 36 Syd L Rev 131; M Arden, ‘Time for an English 
commercial code?’ (1997) 56 CLJ  516; R Goode, ‘The Codification of Commercial Law’ (1986)14 Monash L 
Rev 135. 
18 This is a term that crosses legal systems; French law now adopts this term in preference to ‘bon père de famille’ 





will be context dependent and subject to a finding how subjective/objective such a test should 
be.  Wagner, for example, describes the concept of fault as a ‘battleground’ where rival theories 
of tort law are fought out.19 Cane argues that: 
… making and developing tort law involves striking a balance between the interests we all share in personal and 
financial security on the one hand, and freedom of action on the other.  In this way, tort law establishes a particular 
pattern of distribution of the risks and costs of the types of harm against which it provides protection.  20 
The problem is that this pattern is not self-evident.  It will vary from one jurisdiction to another 
(and over time). In particular, the balance between strict and fault-based liability rests not 
simply with black letter rules, but with the values the State espouses.21 Stability, as Cane 
argues, can only be one factor that is taken into account when establishing the law of tort.  
Flexibility is both desirable and necessary.  
One way in which this flexibility is achieved is by judicial intervention.  In both 
common and civil law systems judges play a significant role in developing the law.  For 
common lawyers, the need for judicial intervention is self-evident: ‘For centuries judges have 
been charged with the responsibility of keeping this law abreast of current social conditions 
and expectations.  That is still the position.’22  Although legislation covers some elements of 
tort law, for example, statutes that provide tortious remedies for issues such as discrimination, 
data misuse or financial misconduct,23 the general principles of tort law are largely constructed 
from case-law, with some statutory assistance.24  Even in civil law systems, while codification 
provides the primary source, judges are not merely ‘la bouche de la loi’, to quote Montesquieu, 
but play a creative role in keeping the provisions of any code alive and relevant to contemporary 
social experience. As Griss has remarked, ‘[i]t is not only judges in common law countries who 
develop the law: developing the law is also an important task of judges in civil law countries.’25 
Portalis, one of the four drafters of the French Civil Code, saw his role as to fix, in broad 
perspective, the general maxims of the law and conceded that judges and legal scholars ‘imbued 
with the general spirit of the law’ would at some point need to assist in the application of the 
law.26 Case-law in both systems then seeks to ensure tort law remains flexible and responsive 
to social change.  The price to be paid for such an approach is a need to systemise the decisions 
in question. Mechanisms do indeed exist to rationalise judicial decision-making.  In common 
law systems, stare decisis relies on the senior courts setting precedents that will guide the lower 
courts and litigants alike. In the absence of a doctrine of stare decisis, civil law systems have 
developed informal practices (which the French term jurisprudence constante and the German 
 
19  G Wagner, ‘Comparative tort law’ in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (2nd edn, OUP 2019) 1013. 
20 P Cane, ‘Taking disagreement seriously: Courts, legislatures and the reform of tort law’ (2005) 25 OJLS 393, 
414.  
21 Magnus comments that the precise scope of tort law ‘depends on the general attitude of the respective legal 
system towards the aims and functions of tort law’: U Magnus, ‘Tort law in general’ in JM Smits (ed), Elgar 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (2nd edn, Edward Elgar 2012) 878. 
22 See Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 2 AC 680, para 32 per Lord Nicholls.  
23 For the influence of EU law in creating such liability see P Giliker (ed), Research Handbook on EU Tort Law 
(Edward Elgar 2017), notably K Stanton, ‘Financial services and regulation’ and M Stauch, ‘Data protection law’. 
24 For example, the Occupiers’ Liability Acts of 1957 and 1984 and Defamation Acts of 1996 and 2013 of England 
and Wales. 
25 I Griss, ‘How Judges Think: Judicial Reasoning in Tort Cases from a Comparative Perspective’ (2013) 4 JETL 
247, 258.  See also R Zimmermann, ‘Codification: History and Present Significance of an Idea’ (1995) 3 ERPL 
95, 114: ‘a code has to be brought to life, and to be kept in tune with the changing demands of time by active and 
imaginative judicial interpretation and doctrinal elaboration.’ 
26 J-E-M. Portalis, ‘Discours préliminaire’ in PA Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux préparatoires du Code civil 
(t1, Videcoq 1830) 464ff.  This is despite the fact art.5, Cciv forbids judges (in the cases that are referred to them) 





ständige Rechtsprechung) by which the courts are expected to take past decisions into account 
when there is a sufficient level of consistency in case law.27 Despite these mechanisms, in both 
systems, uncertainties do nevertheless arise, for example, where inconsistencies are not 
resolved, or authorities clash.   
 
One further difficulty is specific to the common law:  the structure of the common law 
of tort itself.  In adopting a nominate system of torts, derived from the writ system, each 
individual tort has its own requirements for liability.  This caused Rudden to comment that ‘the 
alphabet is virtually the only instrument of intellectual order of which the common law [of tort] 
makes use.’ 28  The fragmentation of English tort law contrasts with the 19th century 
generalisation of tort law in continental Europe.29 Rather than establishing common rules of 
fault or intentional harm, then, the common law focuses on causes of action, be they negligence, 
nuisance or defamation. While common law academics such as Pollock sought to offer some 
rationalisation of tort law as a discipline, rather than a collection of instances,30 as Murphy 
observes, the common law of the 21st century continues to lack structural and juridical unity: 
‘there is no universal form of liability that unites this diverse “family” of wrongs’.31 The law 
of tort is for the common lawyer a law of torts and the law continues to resist arguments in 
favour of one overwhelming theory.32  This does not mean, of course, that there cannot be 
coherence within each individual tort, but simply that systemisation of ‘tort law’ per se is not 
regarded as a priority for the common law. As Rudden commented, the common lawyer’s 
preference is for the particular, rather than higher-level generality.33    
Once we accept that tort law needs flexibility to survive and that open-textured rules by 
their very nature open themselves up to uncertainty, 34   then this will have important 
repercussions on how we approach tort law. The question, therefore, for any system of law is 
not how to remove imprecision, but how best to minimise this inherent uncertainty and render 
the law more coherent. Codification is obviously one means by which a legal system can 
systemise legal rules to render them more accessible, clear and coherent. In examining 
codification, however, it is important first to examine what we mean by ‘codification’ before 




27 V Fon and F Parisi, ‘Judicial precedents in civil law systems: A dynamic analysis’ (2006) 26 International 
Review of Law and Economics 519. 
28 B Rudden, ‘Torticles’ (1991-1992) 6-7 Tulane Civil Law Forum 105, 110. 
29 D Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (OUP 1999) 178. 
30 F Pollock, The Law of Torts: A Treatise on the Principles of Obligations Arising from Civil Wrongs in the 
Common Law (Stevens & Sons 1887). 
31 J Murphy, ‘The Heterogeneity of Tort Law’ (2019) 39 OJLS 455, 482.  
32 This does not mean that attempts are not made to provide theories of common law tort, see, for example, R 
Stevens, Torts and Rights (OUP, 2007); E Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Harvard University Press 1995), but 
these remain at the theory stage: for criticism, see: J Goudkamp and J Murphy, ‘The failure of universal theories 
of tort law’ (2016) 22 Legal Theory 1. Weir’s memorable critique therefore remains: ‘Tort is what is in the tort 
books, and the only thing holding it together is their binding’: T Weir, An Introduction to Tort Law (2nd edn, 
Clarendon Press 2006) ix. 
33 Rudden (n28) 127-129. 





III. CODIFICATION AND CONSOLIDATION: COMMON AND CIVIL LAW 
APPROACHES TO THE SYSTEMISATION OF PRIVATE LAW 
A. Codification 
While the term ‘codification’ is attributed to Englishman, Jeremy Bentham, codes are seen as 
part of the civil law legal tradition, traceable back to Roman law. 35  Varga argues that 
codification is one of the most powerful techniques humanity has ever developed in order to 
objectify its law.36 The French Civil Code of 1804 is commonly regarded as the leading 
prototype of a civil law codification. A product of the rational and scientific thinking of the 
Enlightenment, it brought together the customary and written law of the ancien régime and 
replaced it with a text that sought to present private law in a coherent, clear and comprehensive 
manner.  Certain key characteristics of a civilian code may be identified. It is a self-contained 
text enacted by the legislature that seeks to formulate systematically a set of abstract general 
principles that bring the law together in a coherent form.37 It replaces earlier law and becomes 
the primary source of law.38 It may also seek to establish a particular ideological framework: 
in the case of the French Civil Code one that is revolutionary, rationalistic and non-technical 
in character, in the case of the 1900 German Civil Code, one that is historically orientated, 
scientific and professional.39 Rivera notes also the symbolic force of a code, often given a value 
equivalent to that of the Constitution.40 
Codification appears at first glance the obvious response to legal uncertainty. By 
reasoning deductively from legal rules set out in a civil code, the law, it is argued, is more 
likely to be applied in a rational and predictable manner.41 Granted an elevated status as the 
primary source of private law, this does not mean, however, that judges have no role in legal 
development in civil law systems .42  What it signifies is that while judges will interpret the law 
to keep it up to date, they must work within the conceptual structure of the code.43 As Steiner 
explains: 
 
35 M Siems, Comparative Law (2nd edn, CUP 2018) 51. The term ‘codification’ represents the methodology; 
‘code’ the graphic expression of the written law: E Steiner, French Law: A Comparative Approach (2nd ed., OUP 
2018) 27.  The term ‘code’ can be traced back to the Latin codex meaning a compilation of statutory law. 
Codification as we know it today, however, originated in late 17th and 18th century legal science:   Zimmermann 
(n25), 98. 
36 C Varga, Codification as a Socio-Historical Phenomenon (2nd ed,  Szent István Társulat 2011) 27. 
37 A Tunc, ‘The Grand Outlines of the Code’ 29 Tul L Rev 431, 435-41 (1955).   
38 See FF Stone, ‘A Primer on Codification’ 29 Tul L Rev 303, 305-306 (1955). 
39 JH Merryman and R Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition (4th edn, Stanford University Press 2019) 28- 31. 
For ideological and intellectual differences between the French and Germanic legal traditions, see RC Van 
Caenegem, Judges, Legislators and Professors (Revised ed, CUP 2006). 
40 JC Rivera, ‘The scope and structure of civil codes’ in JC Rivera (ed), The Scope and Structure of Civil Codes 
(Springer 2013) 8. 
41 This is, as Siems notes, a generalisation and codes as old as the French Civil Code of 1804 will inevitably lose 
their deductive ‘power’ unless updated: M Siems, ‘Comparative Legal Certainty: Legal Families and Forms of 
Measurement’ in M Fenwick, M Siems and S Wrbka, The Shifting Meaning of Legal Certainty in Comparative 
and Transnational Law (Hart 2017) 115, 121. 
42 See CM Germain, ‘Approaches to statutory interpretation and legislative history in France’ (2003) 13 Duke J 
Comp & Int’l L 195.  





 … [codes] are still regarded [by civil law systems] as the primary source of private law and they serve as essential 
day-to-day working instruments for French lawyers.  In law schools as well, students are encouraged to become 
familiar, as early as possible, with the layout and component parts of the codes. 44   
Codes, therefore, impact not only as sources of law, but on how lawyers think.45  Codification 
influences their education, legal training and the form private law judgments take.46   
Yet it should not be thought that all codes represent full civilian style codification. In 
reality, ‘codification’ has a variety of meanings and civil law systems recognise a variety of 
intermediary categories ranging from mere compilations of statutory material to full-fledged 
codifications.47 This diversity, for Tallon, is perhaps the major feature of codification today.48  
As Steiner has noted, while French law has grand projects such as its Civil and Criminal Code, 
more frequently it engages in a process known as codification à droit constant where the aim 
is simply to gather together and list existing law to render it more accessible and remove any 
obsolete provisions.49 Codifications may thus be large-scale or minor, each bringing different 
challenges to the drafters and the legal community who apply the rules.50     
Codes are not, however, confined to civil law systems. The term ‘codification’ has been 
used to describe 19thuu century common law statutes such as the Sale of Goods Act 1893 and 
Bills of Exchange Act 1882. The United States indeed has many codes at state level (e.g. the 
California Civil Code) and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) at national level.  However, 
despite the use of the term ‘codification’, it is widely acknowledged that these instruments are 
not in the same style as civilian codes.  The California Civil Code, for example, while organised 
in the manner of many civil law codes, is largely a consolidation of well-established common 
law principles. The UCC is exceptional in being influenced by the civilian drafting style,51 but 
has been described by civil lawyers as ‘a collection of private solutions’.52 Equally, while the 
Sale of Goods Act 1893 (or indeed the Bills of Exchange Act 1882) have been described by 
some judges as a code,53 in reality, they represent a collection of legal rules, drawn together as 
a point of reference for those engaged in this specific field. McKendrick, with typical clarity, 
highlights why such legislation is not a code in the civilian sense: 
Statements that the 1893 Act is a ‘Code’ or that the [Sale of Goods Act] 1979 is a ‘single code’ are apt to mislead. 
They give the impression that the legislation is the sole repository of the law relating to the sale of goods when 
this is far from the case. The Act is built upon common law foundations and the common law … The Sale of 
 
44 Steiner (n35), 25.    
45 J Bell, French Legal Cultures (Butterworths 2001) 56. 
46 Bell (n43) 73. 
47 Consider, for example, the French Code de commerce that has been described as a compilation of statutes on 
different subjects including insolvency and company law: J-S Borghetti, ‘French Law’ in Rivera (ed) (n40). 
48 D Tallon, 'Codification and consolidation of the law at the present time' (1979) 14 Israel Law Review 1, 3. 
49 E Steiner, ‘Codification in England: The need to move from an ideological to a functional approach—A bridge 
too far’ (2004) 25 Statute L Rev 209, 212. Note, in particular, the work of the Commission supérieure de 
codification established by Décret n°89-647 of 12 September 1989: https://www.gouvernement.fr/commission-
superieure-de-codification.  
50 Note a different meaning again at EU level: Council of EU, ‘Concept of codification and consolidation at the 
EU level - Explanatory Note’, 23 June 2014: see https://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/recasting_en.htm. 
51 Siems (n35) 53. On the influence of Karl Llewellyn in the drafting of the UCC, see S Herman, 'The Fate and 
Future of Codification in America' 40 American Journal of Legal History 407, 427-432 (1996), who notes, 
nonetheless, differences from continental civil codes. 
52 A Diamond, ‘Codification of the Law of Contract’ (1968) 31 M.L.R. 361, reporting a private conversation at 
379 with Denis Tallon. 





Goods Act 1979 may be the first port of call for the lawyer seeking to advise on a sale of goods problem but it is 
not necessarily the last nor the most important.54   
The closest English example to a code may be found in relation to legislation designed to 
transplant English law to parts of the British Empire. Legislation such as the Indian Contract 
Act 1872 transported the common law of contract to India. (Pollock’s 1886 draft bill to codify 
the law of civil wrongs, commissioned by Government of India, never eventuated.55)  While 
far from the style of a continental civil code, this legislation included explanations and 
illustrations to assist those implementing the law overseas.56  The reason for this form of 
legislation, however, was largely pragmatic; Diamond arguing that the format was a response 
to an undermanned legal profession where books were hard to get.57 
B.  Consolidation 
In general, what common lawyers regard as ‘codes’ are statutory attempts to consolidate 
existing law, building on the principles stated in case law, which, under the doctrine of 
precedent, remain binding until overturned.  There is no attempt to provide a comprehensive 
statement of the law. Despite, then, the advocacy of writers such as Bentham of French-style 
codification in the 19th century, 58  codification to an English lawyer is synonymous with 
legislation consolidating existing laws.  The value of this exercise should not, however, be 
under-estimated. Gathering the relevant law in one place renders it more accessible and enables 
the legislator to resolve inconsistencies and/or gaps rendering the law more coherent.  
Importantly, with a system of stare decisis, such legislation, unlike a code, has no need to set 
out the basic structure of the law – this has been established by earlier case-law precedents. A 
key distinguishing factor, therefore, is that any common law version of ‘codification’ retains 
existing case-law; full-scale civil law codifications replace.  The style of Parliamentary drafting 
in the UK further renders common law ‘codes’ very different to the principled and abstract 
style of the continental codes. There is no ‘omni-comprehensive’ statute law culture in the 
UK;59 the preference is for statutes on specific topics, be it sale of goods, occupiers’ liability 
or defamation rather than entire fields of law.  
What we see, therefore, is a different systemisation of law with a preference for the piecemeal 
rather than the absolute. Statutes, in private law, generally supplement the common law.  While 
technically a superior source, they exist alongside judicial precedents that have force of law 
thanks to the doctrine of stare decisis.   
It is interesting that the Law Commission of England and Wales has distanced itself 
from what it terms ‘continental style’ codification despite the fact that the Law Commissions 
Act 1965 requires the Commission to review the law ‘including in particular the codification 
 
54 E McKendrick, ‘Sale of Goods’ in AS Burrows (ed), Principles of English Commercial Law (OUP 2015) para 
2.02. 
55 Although, along with commentary, it was included as an appendix to early editions of his textbook: Pollock’s 
The Law of Torts. See N Duxbury, Frederick Pollock and the English Juristic Tradition (OUP 2004) 25. 
56 See W Swain, ‘Contract codification and the English: some observations from the Indian Contract Act 1872’ in 
J Devenney and M Kenny (eds), The Transformation of European Private Law (CUP 2013) 172, who notes that 
attempts to extend Indian codification to England were unsuccessful: 191. 
57 Diamond (n52) 362. 
58 Note also the strong debate in the 19th century United States and, in particular, the work of David Dudley Field, 
outlined in AP Morriss, ‘Codification and right answers’ 74 Chicago-Kent Rev 355 (1999). 
59 Z Bankowski and DN MacCormick, ‘Statutory interpretation in the United Kingdom’ in DN MacCormick and 





of such law’.60 This mission statement led to several proposals for codification.  In its First 
Programme of Law Reform in 1965, the Commission pledged to examine the possibility of the 
codification of contract and landlord and tenant law, adding in 1968 the possibility of codifying 
criminal law.61    A code of contract was indeed drafted for the Law Commission by McGregor 
in 1971.62 Yet all such projects have been abandoned (the McGregor Code only reaching the 
public eye when published in Italy in 1993).  A number of reasons may be found; some practical 
(cost in terms of time and resources to draft and implement a code) and some political (lack of 
government support; opposition from various interest groups).63  While the Law Commission’s 
proposal for a Sentencing Code was recently enacted in the Sentencing Act 2020,64 this is not 
a code recognisable to a civilian.  It is in fact a consolidation of the existing legislation 
governing sentencing procedure, bringing together provisions from the Powers of Criminal 
Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 and parts of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, amongst others. The 
aim is to provide the first port of call for legislation concerning sentencing procedure. Its selling 
point (and the reason it received government support)65 is its utility to practitioners. It is not, 
and does not aim to be, a general statement of principle.  Ormerod, who pushed strongly for 
the Code as a Law Commissioner, has described the process behind the Code as ‘consolidation 
plus’ – consolidation of the existing law with the inclusion of policy refinement when 
necessary.66   
C. Codification v. consolidation 
We need therefore to distinguish ‘codification’ from ‘consolidation’. What common 
lawyers mean by ‘codification’ is consolidation (collating existing law) or ‘consolidation plus’ 
(collating existing law plus policy initiatives). For common lawyers to engage in civilian style 
full codification would require a massive shift of practice, both in terms of legal reasoning and 
the treatment of legal sources. Adapting to the abstract principled style of the civilian code for 
lawyers steeped in detailed rules of statutory interpretation and stare decisis would, in the 
words of Hogg, be a ‘fiendishly hard exercise’,67  requiring ‘an enormous cultural shift before 
a legal profession brought up in the common law tradition would embrace it.’ 68  It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that common lawyers prefer to adhere to their own method of 
 
60 s.3(1). See PM North, ‘Problems of Codification in a Common Law System’ (1982) 46 RabelsZ 490. 
61 Family law has also been contemplated: see S. Cretney, ‘The codification of family law’ (1981) 44 MLR 1. 
62 H McGregor, Contract Code: Drawn up on behalf of the English Law Commission (Guiffré 1993). In 1972 the 
Commission suspended work on the code and decided to adopt a topic-by-topic approach. 
63 See S Wilson Stark, The Work of the British Law Commissions: Law Reform …Now? (Hart 2017) 166-169. The 
failure of the McGregor Code is chronicled in JH Farrar, ‘Law reform now: A comparative view’ (1976) 25 ICLQ 
214 which included opposition from the Scottish Law Commission (which withdrew from the project in 1971).   
64 The Act is based on Law Com Report n°382, The Sentencing Code: A Report (2018).: 
65 The government envisages that the Sentencing Code will ‘provide much needed clarity, reducing errors and 
restoring faith that the law is being applied correctly’: Press release, ‘Sentencing Code granted Royal Assent’ 22 
October 2020 per Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Robert Buckland QC.   
66 H O’Sullivan and D Ormerod, ‘Time for a Code: Reform of Sentencing Law in England and Wales’ (2017) 19 
Eur JL Reform 285, 304.  
67 M Hogg, ‘Codification of Private Law: Scots Law at the Crossroads of Common and Civil Law’ in Barker (n7) 
113. See also FH Lawson, A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law (OUP, 1953) 66-69. For an overview of the 
difference styles of statutory interpretation, see RS Summers and M Taruffo, ‘Interpretation and comparative 
analysis’ in MacCormick and Summers (n59) above. 
68 W Swain, ‘Predicting the direction of Australian contract law in the next 25 years’ in Barker (ed) (n7) 94. See 
also R Goff, ‘The Future of the Common Law’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 745, 753 who observed that common lawyers 
tend to avoid large, abstract, statutory generalisations of private law in favour of principles gradually emerging 





systemisation that reflects how they treat sources of law and engage in legal reasoning. Each 
system, as Kötz once commented, must find its own solution to find order, form and structure 
shaped to its own needs.69   
In systemising tort law, therefore, we can see two different styles of systemisation.  I 
will first examine codification and draw insights from the most recent attempt to codify tort 
law, found in the French proposals to reform the tort provisions of its Civil Code.  This will be 
followed by an examination of common law attempts to consolidate tort law.  In critically 
appraising both methodologies, this article will consider how each methodology responds to 
the need for greater clarity and accessibility in the law of tort.  Are changes needed?  
Improvements required?   
IV. CIVIL LAW CODIFICATION: THE 2017 PROPOSALS TO MODERNISE AND 
UPDATE THE TORT PROVISIONS OF THE CODE CIVIL  
The French 2017 Projet de réforme du droit de la responsabilité civile provides a contemporary 
illustration of tort law reform by means of a large-scale civilian style codification.  That this is 
much needed is not in doubt.   While the 1804 Code has been revised many times, for example, 
to introduce measures to deal with bioethics and protect privacy and against defective 
products,70 the tort section of the Code still largely resembles its original version of 1804.  As 
an early 19th century code, the tort provisions, responding to the needs of a pre-industrialisation 
largely agrarian society, were limited, famously encapsulated, until 1998, in a mere five 
articles.  These focussed on issues arising in the early 19th century life (two out of the five 
articles deal with civil liability for damage caused by animals and dilapidated buildings).71  At 
its core is liability for fault. Art.1382 (now 1240) provides that any human action whatsoever 
which causes harm to another creates an obligation in the person by whose fault it occurred to 
make reparation for it. Such limited provision rapidly became inadequate in the face of 
industrialisation and the occurrence of new and unanticipated forms of harm.  In the face of 
social and economic change, it was left to the courts to intervene and, from the late nineteenth 
century, they adopted a liberal interpretation of the Code. As Whittaker noted: 
These provisions on [tort] in the Civil Code are indeed a triumph of generalization … However, if the generality 
of these provisions themselves is considerable, the generalizing interpretation of them by the courts has been 
extraordinary.72  
Notable judicial developments include creating rules of strict liability for motor accidents73 and 
defective products,74 an objective notion of fault,75 and a broad notion of strict liability for the 
torts of others (fait d’autrui) and for harm caused by objects under your control (fait de choses) 
extending beyond the specific instances listed under art.1242 of the Code.  While framed as 
interpretations of existing codal provisions, the French Supreme Court, in reality, was 
 
69 H Kötz, ‘Taking civil codes less seriously’ (1987) 50 MLR 1, 15. 
70 Rivera (n40) 16. 
71 See arts.1385 and 1386 of the 1804 Code (now arts.1243 and 1244). Articles 1382-1386 of the 1804 Code civil 
were renumbered 1240-1244 in 2016.   
72 J Bell, S Boyron and S Whittaker, Principles of French Law (2nd ed, OUP 2008) 361-362.  
73 Ch réun 13 February 1930 (Jand’heur) DP 1930.1.57 note G Ripert, rapport Le Marc'hadour; S 1930.1.121 note 
P Esmein.   
74 Cass. Civ. 16 June 1896 (Teffaine) S 1897.1.17 note A Esmein ; D 1897.1.433 note R Saleilles.   





elaborating new principles of tort law. In the Jand'heur case of 1930,76 for example, the court 
relied on art.1242(1) of the Civil Code77  to hold the driver of a motor vehicle strictly liable to 
a victim in a road accident.  The fact that art.1242(1) was an introductory provision and tort 
liability had traditionally rested primarily on proof of fault did not prevent the court from 
developing a rule of strict liability when faced with a rising number of motor accident claims. 
In so doing, in the words of Whittaker, it gave expression to ‘a juristic concern for the victims 
of the machine age, it being thought unjust that they should be left without compensation owing 
to an inability to identify and prove fault’.78  More recently, in the 1990s, the French courts 
extended strict liability under art.1242(1) to include the liability of institutions for the torts of 
third parties where they were found to be responsible for organising and controlling their 
actions. 79  This included, in the Blieck  case, privately-run care centres which were held strictly 
liable for the harmful acts of mentally handicapped individuals under their care80 and even 
extended to sports clubs which were held strictly liable for the negligence of their members 
when injuring a fellow competitor during a sporting event.81   
Yet, in developing principles of French tort law outside the Civil Code, the courts have 
inevitably diminished the explanatory power of the Code as a primary source of law. 82 Lawyers 
today can only gain an accurate understanding of the modern principles of French tort law by 
reading not only the Code, but related case-law and legal commentary. In this sense the French 
law of tort bears a resemblance to the common law – case-law supplementing limited statutory 
sources. Both systems share the same difficulties, therefore, in systemising and rationalising 
case-law developments.  
The 2017 projet seeks to resolve this uncertainty and reassert the status of the Code 
civil as the primary source of tort law by integrating key case-law developments into the Code. 
Its aims are three-fold – to consolidate and clarify existing law, to improve the position of 
personal injury victims and to modernise and enrich the law to create a 21st century law of 
tort.83    
A. Making Existing Law Clearer, More Accessible and Predictable 
The proposals would increase the tort articles of the Civil Code from five (in 1804) to 83, and, 
in so doing, provide a far more detailed exposition of the rules relating to: loss (arts.1235-1238); 
causation (arts.1239-1240); fault-based liability (arts.1241-1242-1); strict liability (arts.1243-
1249); defences (arts.1253-1257-1); remedies (arts.1258-1266-1) and the assessment of losses 
arts.1267-1280).  The EU Product Liability Directive continues to be implemented by the Civil 
Code (art.1289-1299-3).  For added clarity, nuisance is now expressly mentioned in the tort 
 
76 See (n73). 
77 Then art.1384(1)]. A Code of 1804 unsurprisingly made no provision for motor vehicle accidents. 
78 Principles of French Law (n72) 382. The concept of strict liability for damage caused by objects under your 
use, direction and control (fait des choses) has survived despite subsequent legislation introducing a strict liability 
statutory regime for motor vehicle accidents. 
79 See M Josselin-Gall, ‘La responsabilité du fait d’autrui sur le fondement de l’article 1384(1) : Une théorie 
génèrale est-elle possible ?’ JCP 2000.I.268. 
80 Ass plén 29 March 1991 D 1991.324 note C. Larroumet, somm. 324 obs. J-L Aubert. 
81 See, for example, Civ. 2e, 22 May 1995 JCP  1995, II, 22550, note C Mouly. 
82 Note also special tort regimes created by statute (see below). See F Leduc, ‘Le droit de la responsabilité civile 
hors le code civil’ LPA 6 July 2005; Ministry of Justice, Projet de réforme du droit de la responsabilité civile 
(Dossier de Presse 2017) 1. 
83 It is not, therefore, simply a codification à droit constant but one which seeks to innovate: F Terré, P Simler, Y 





section (art.1244).84 The 19th century decision to have specific articles imposing liability for 
animals and dilapidated buildings is overturned in favour of inclusion within the general 
provisions of the Code. 
The treatment of ‘fault’ provides a good example of the new approach.  As stated 
earlier, this concept was central to the 1804 Code and yet not defined. Art.1241 repeats in 
clearer terms the wording of the current art.1240 - a person is liable for the harm caused by his 
fault -but art.1242 now adds a definition of fault as a ‘violation of a legislative requirement or 
a failure in the general duty of care or diligence.’85 Existing provisions are also set out in more 
detail.  For example, the 1804 article on strict liability for the torts of others (art.1384)86 is 
redrafted as five separate articles (1245—1249) and incorporates case-law developments from 
the 19th century onwards e.g. the 1991 Blieck decision on fait d’autrui is restated at arts.1246-
1247.87   Consolidation, however, is not simply a mechanical exercise, particularly in a system 
without a doctrine of stare decisis.  Choices had to be made determining which judicial 
decisions to incorporate as ‘the law’. Where decisions are regarded as arrêts de principe (cases 
expressing rules of general importance), the decision is made easier, but it is not decisive.  
Some arrêts de principe were found to be too controversial to be retained, e.g. the Supreme 
Court decision that parents would be held strictly liable for the harmful acts of their children 
even where the child was not proven to be at fault.88 Art.1245(2) of the reforms would provide 
that liability for the acts of another depends on proof of an action of a nature to engage the 
liability of the direct author of the harm.   
The abstract style of a Code does, however, limit the level of detail permissible to 
drafters.  Long and detailed definitions (and tests) are not the province of a code. It is helpful 
here to review the three key elements of fault-based liability: fault, causation and harm.  Fault 
is for the first time defined in the proposals, but art.1242, in reality, does little more than give 
an overview of ideas found in case-law.  The nature of the ‘general duty of care or diligence’ 
remains as much a matter for court development as is the case in the common law.  ‘Causation’ 
(art.1239), while stated as a condition of liability, oddly remains undefined. We are simply told 
that causation can be established by any means of proof. Was the task too difficult within the 
restraints of a code or simply too controversial? This is particularly unfortunate given the 
tendency of the French courts to vacillate between two main tests of causation89  (entirely 
permissible in a system without stare decisis).  In contrast, while harm (dommage – a condition 
 
84 As Kennefick ably describes, the French equivalent of the English tort of nuisance (troubles de voisinage) is a 
judicial, not codal, creation: C Kennefick, ‘Nuisance and coming to the nuisance’ in J-S Borghetti and S Whittaker 
(eds), French Civil Liability in Comparative Perspective (Hart 2019) 224. 
85 The translations used in this article are taken from the excellent translation of Simon Whittaker and Jean-
Sébastien Borghetti: see http://www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/textes-soumis-a-concertation-10179/projet-de-
reforme-de-la-responsabilite-civile-traduit-en-anglais-30553.html. 
86 Renumbered art.1242 in 2016. 
87 Physical or legal persons are to be held strictly liable if charged by judicial or administrative decision with 
organising and controlling (i) the minor’s way of life on a permanent basis or (ii) the adult’s way of life on a 
permanent basis.  This is noticeably a far more precise test than that stated in Blieck. Contrast art.1248 (dealing 
with persons who, by contract and by way of business or profession, undertake supervision or organisation and 
control of another person) which is less than clear; Häcker arguing that in trying to cover too much in one article, 
coherence is lost:  B Häcker, ‘Fait d’autrui in comparative perspective’ in Borghetti and Whittaker (eds) (n84) 
157-159. 
88 Ass plén 13 December 2002 D.2003.231 note P Jourdain. Parental liability for their children is set out in 
art.1242(4) of the Code civil and art.1246 of the reforms. 





of both fault-based90 and strict91 liability) is not defined, loss (prejudice) 92 resulting from harm 
is dealt with in considerable detail.  There is a general section covering key principles for the 
compensation of loss arising from contractual and tortious liability,93 and special rules govern 
the reparation of losses resulting from personal injury, physical damage to property, 
environmental harm and delays in payment of money. 94  Such measures are intended to 
diminish the power of the French Supreme Court to control the actionability of harm, but do 
raise a number of unanswered questions, not least the relationship between dommage and 
préjudice.95  The debate as to the division between these two terms is therefore likely to 
continue. 96  Greater detail does not, therefore, necessarily correlate with greater clarity. In 
particular, in choosing to adopt a particular conceptual framework in which to consolidate 
existing law, it is not clear whether the aim is purely consolidation or whether some degree of 
change is intended.  Despite, therefore, increased detail and length, uncertainties remain.  
One further dilemma faced the drafters.  While product liability was added to the Code 
civil in 1998,97 to what extent should a codification of tort include other special regimes 
providing compensation for victims of tortious actions?  Should it include all regimes giving 
compensation for personal injuries? Or insurance measures designed to assist tort claims?  Or 
even social security measures that provide alternative forms of compensation for victims?98  
The decision was taken to integrate legislation on motor vehicle accidents,99  but go no further.  
On this basis, the measures do not include special compensation funds, established, for 
example, in the wake of the contaminated blood scandal,100  for victims of injuries following 
compulsory vaccinations101 and for those suffering a medical accident or infection as a result 
of urgent measures taken to combat serious health risks.102  These remain in other Codes, 103 
such as the Public Health Code or, in the case of nuclear accidents, the Environmental Code.104  
 
90 Art.1241 states in French, ‘On est responsible du dommage causé par sa faute’ 
91 See arts.1243-1249. 
92 Art.1235: ‘Any certain loss is reparable where it results from harm and consists of an injury to a lawful interest, 
whether patrimonial or extra-patrimonial’.   
93 Arts.1235-1238. 
94 Arts.1267-1280. 
95 See D. Leczykiewicz, ‘Loss and its compensation in the proposed new French regime’ and P Sirena, ‘The 
concepts of “harm” in the French and Italian laws of civil liability’ in Borghetti and Whittaker (eds) (n84).  
96 See F Leduc, ‘Faut-il distinguer le dommage et le préjudice?: point de vue privatiste’ RCA 2010, 3, dossier no 
3. One might also flag use of the term ‘lawful interest’ (intérêt licite) in art.1235 which is not used by the majority 
of legal commentators. 
97 To implement the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC.  See arts.1245 – 1245-17, Cciv, although these 
provisions would be expanded under the reform. 
98 For a brief overview of the interplay among social security, direct private insurance, the tort system, and 
compensation funds in France, see G Viney, Traité de droit civil. L’introduction à la responsabilité (3rd edn, 
LGDJ 2008) n°s 27-32.   
99 Arts.1285-1288 but extended to trams and railways. It is currently found in a separate statute: loi Badinter n° 
85-677 of 5 July 1985. See, generally, A Tunc, ‘La loi française du 5 juillet 1985 sur l'indemnisation des victimes 
d'accidents de la circulation’ (1985) 37 RIDC 1019. 
100 See art.L.3122-1 Public Health Code (victims of HIV) and art.L.1221-14 Public Health Code, introduced by 
loi n° 2008-1330 of 17 December 2008 (victims of Hepatitis C).   
101 Art.L.3111-9 Public Health Code. 
102 Art.L 3131-4 Public Health Code.  Nor is any attempt made to include the reforms to medical liability 
introduced by loi n° 2002-303 of 4 March 2002 which remain in the Public Health Code.  
103 See, generally, J Knetsch, Le droit de la responsabilité et les fonds d’indemnisation (LGDJ 2013). 





Codification, especially in tort, is rarely comprehensive given the many ways victims of 
personal injury can receive compensation.   
This leads to a number of conclusions. First that codification may be regarded as helpful 
in assisting in the consolidation of existing law, but it is not a straightforward exercise. 105 In 
choosing which sources to consolidate, decisions of policy must be taken.106 These are not 
necessarily uncontroversial, as seen above. Secondly, as Borghetti and Whittaker identify, the  
drafting of the provisions reflects a particular style, notably one that seeks to state legal rules 
broadly, bringing together different things under a single concept or idea, rather than 
emphasising their differences.107 This will impact on the level of detail permissible.  Thirdly, 
while the proposals do seek to resolve certain conceptual conflicts and provide more 
information for litigants, such detail comes at a price, notably that it is likely to give rise to a 
fresh set of interpretative challenges for the courts.  Finally, it is not clear to what extent, despite 
the efforts of the drafters, a reformed code will constrain judicial expansionism.  Attempts have 
been made to limit judicial intervention but inevitably in an area of law that seeks to respond 
to social change, some flexibility must be permitted.  A more serious concern is whether judges, 
used to developing this area of law, will accept this limit on their interpretative powers.  
B. Protecting Personal Injury Victims and Modernising and Enriching Tort Law 
The French proposals also exemplify a second potential benefit of codification –a means by 
which the legislator can reflect on and set out the goals and objectives of law, responding to 
the needs of contemporary society. Which victims, asked the drafters, should a 21st century law 
of tort seek to protect?  What are its goals? Should it be responding to new forms of harm?108 
Consistent with the victim-centred tradition of French tort law,109 the proposals make clear that 
priority should be given to the protection of personal injury victims. This is achieved in two 
ways.  First, the proposals advocate improved legal protection for victims.  These include the 
prohibition of agreements that exclude or limit damages for personal injury (art.1281), 
confining the reduction of any award of compensation to gross contributory negligence (faute 
lourde) by the victim (art.1254(2)), and removing any duty on the victim to minimise his or 
her loss (art.1263). 110  Secondly, the proposals seek to make the law clearer and more 
accessible.  The principle of full compensation (réparation intégrale) is expressly affirmed at 
art.1235, with a later section dedicated to the rules governing the assessment of personal injury 
 
105 For unanswered questions and uncertainties created by the 2016 reforms to the contract provisions of the Code 
civil: see S Rowan, ‘The new French Law of Contract’ (2017) 66 ICLQ 805. 
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107 See J-S Borghetti and S Whittaker, ‘Principles of liability or a law of torts?’ in Borghetti and Whittaker (eds) 
(n84) at 459-460. 
108 e.g. ecological/environmental damage was inserted into the Code civil in 2016 (arts.1246-1252 following the 
Biodiversity Law n°2016-1087 of August 8, 2016). 
109 See J-S Borghetti, ‘The culture of tort law in France’ (2012) 3 JETL 158. 
110 Art.1233-1 also removes the principle of non-accumulation of actions (non-cumul) for personal injury victims.  
The principle of non-accumulation of actions in French law has led to distinctions which are difficult to justify 
e.g. the victim of medical negligence is compensated differently depending on whether she had been a private 





damages.111 For  Laithier, ‘the ranking of protected interests plays an unheralded role in the 
draft law by way of its favourable treatment of the victim of personal injury’.112   
However, the drafters go further and propose that, in addition to the overall goal of 
victim protection, the code should acknowledge that tort law, as a matter of policy, should seek 
to prevent harm and, on occasion, punish. Here the French Ministry of Justice accepted the 
view of a number of influential academic writers that the preventative function of civil liability 
should be inscribed in the Civil Code.113 Art.1266 would extend existing provisions that permit 
interlocutory injunctive relief to prevent harm114 to all tort claims. 115  Judges would be able to 
grant injunctive relief to prevent harm or see that unlawful misconduct is stopped (cessation 
de l’illicite).  In terms of punishment, the reforms reject the idea of punitive damages, but 
propose instead to extend existing legislative provision for civil penalties which sanction 
breaches of public or civil duties. Art.1266-1 provides that faute lucrative (torts committed for 
profit) should be punished by a civil penalty (l’amende civile) payable to the Treasury or 
relevant compensation fund.116 Such a sum would be uninsurable,117 with guidance given to 
the level of the penalty.118  Here codification engages with fundamental questions of tort law 
and provides a framework for future development of the law.  
These latter reforms, while innovative,119 have given rise to controversy. For example, 
while prevention of harm may be a laudable goal of private law, the wording of art.1266 grants 
judges a potentially wide discretion to intervene in tort cases. In particular, by permitting 
intervention prior to the harm taking place, it raises clear issues of undue interference with the 
rights of innocent third parties, and defendants whose wrongdoing has yet to be proven.120 For 
this very reason, English law adopts a cautious approach that seeks to confine injunctive relief 
to situations where there is clear evidence of potential wrongdoing and the high possibility of 
substantial damage occurring if an injunction is not awarded.121 Here the nature of the codal 
 
111 Arts.1267-1277. 
112 Y-M Laithier, ‘The relationship between contractual and extra-contractual liability’ in Borghetti and Whittaker 
(eds) (n84) 52.  
113 See, notably, C Bloch, La cessation de l'illicite - Recherche sur une fonction méconnue de la responsabilité 
civile extracontractuelle (thèse Aix-Marseille III 2008).  It was also part of earlier reform proposals, see F Terré, 
Pour une réforme du droit de la responsabilité civile (Dalloz 2011) which gave it considerable prominence, 
placing prevention of harm at art. 2 of the proposals. 
114 See e.g. art.835(1), Code of Civil Procedure (modified in 2019) on the référé procedure. 
115 ‘In extra-contractual matters, independently of any reparation of loss which may have been suffered, a court 
may prescribe reasonable measures appropriate to prevent harm or to see that an unlawful nuisance to which a 
claimant is exposed is stopped.’  See also art.1244(2) [abnormal nuisance between neighbours] which permits the 
court to order reasonable measures which require a nuisance between neighbours to be stopped.   
116 Art.1266-1: ‘… in extra-contractual matters, where the author of the harm has deliberately committed a fault 
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and by specially justified decision, condemn him to the payment of a civil penalty.’ See also art.1266-1(5). 
117 Art. 1266-1(6). 
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119 A further goal of the reforms was to try when possible to establish rules of responsabilité civile (civil liability) 
removing the need to distinguish between contractual and tortious remedies.  This had mixed success e.g. arts 
1266 and 1266-1 apply to tort only. 
120 See P Giliker, ‘Injunctions requiring the cessation of unlawful action’ in Borghetti and Whittaker (eds) (n84); 
Lord Sumption in Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13; [2014] AC 822, para161.  





provision – an abstract statement of principle, without guidance – has raised concern. There is 
no formal indication how the courts will interpret this provision.  
Similar concerns have been raised in terms of punishment. Traditionally, French law 
has opposed the award of punitive damages on the basis that they provide claimants with a 
windfall and conflict with the goal of full compensation.122 While the civil penalty avoids such 
criticism, it has been challenged as an illegitimate move towards a more normative and 
repressive role for civil law.123 Further its lack of precision has given rise to concerns as to its 
constitutionality. This is unsurprising given that challenges have been made to similar 
legislative provisions.124 The reaction of the business community has also been critical, both 
of its uncertain procedure and the potentially high fines which art.1266-1(4) indicates to be as 
high as 5% of the highest amount of the business’ revenue in the course of one of the fiscal 
years.125 A review in July 2020 recommended that the reforms be slimmed down and less 
ambitious. 126  In particular, it recommended that l’amende civile should be deleted from the 
reforms in that it was likely to encourage opposition to the proposals.  
C. Codification and the Law of Tort 
The 2017 French tort law projet highlights many of the benefits and disbenefits of civilian style 
codification. On a positive level the projet permits modernisation, new initiatives to protect 
personal injury victims and more detailed provisions that incorporate case-law and statutory 
developments in tort law since 1804. It provides a framework for lawyers and a clearer starting 
point for litigants pursuing a claim in tort.  It also promotes a broader discussion as to the aims 
and objectives of tort and its relationship with contract. Significant steps are proposed to 
improve the position of personal injury victims both substantively in terms of more favourable 
rules, but also in terms of accessibility, setting out the rules governing reparation of losses 
resulting from personal injury and integrating into the Code the law relating to motor vehicle 
accidents (a major source of personal injury liability).127 Significant case law developments, 
notably in relation to strict liability, are brought into the Code.  However, not all provisions 
have been welcomed with open arms.  Measures that are over-ambitious or do not represent 
settled law (or political consensus) may prove disruptive. It would be very surprising, for 
example, if the final version of the reforms contains l’amende civile which many regard as a 
step too far. Not all policy initiatives represent the views of the legal community as a whole. 
More fundamentally, the drafting of the proposals is likely to give rise to a number of problems 
 
122 See, for example, Y Lambert-Faivre, ‘L’éthique de la responsabilité’ RTDciv 1998.1, 19 and J-S Borghetti, 
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with interpretation.  Certain key terms are either not defined or described with such a degree 
of generality that reference to case-law will still be needed.  Nevertheless, it is very much hoped 
that the projet will be implemented in some form.  At present, the tort provisions of the code 
provide limited assistance for litigants and, as a form of systemisation, they therefore fail to 
provide citizens with the benefits that codification can potentially provide.  Change is needed 
and while it has not proven a straightforward process, progress is being made. 
It is important at this stage to appraise the French tort law proposals on their own terms, 
that is, a full civilian style codification.  Common lawyers advocating codification need to be 
wary of idealising codes as a one-stop-shop in which one may find in a single legislative source 
the whole of tort law.  Codes represent not a comprehensive compendium of the law, but rather 
a starting point for travellers.   They provide ‘the bedrock of principles that shape the nation’s 
jurisprudence’.128  This does not mean that doctrinal debates will cease, nor that litigants will 
obtain clear guidance on all points of law.  It is, as Bell and Ibbetson state, a reference point 
for legal debate rather than a prescription of what citizens must do.129 In triggering a legal 
debate, assistance will be derived from two sources.  First, as stated in Section II above, judges 
will play an important role in interpreting and applying codal provisions.  Secondly, legal 
scholarship will also play a significant part in civil law systems in elaborating the meaning of 
codal provisions and systemising case-law.130 Jestaz and Jamin in their leading work outline 
the great benefits to any legal system of scholarship that is systematic, aims at clarity, avoids 
abstract concepts and includes work from law professors, judges and practitioners. 131  For 
Sacco, legal scholarship represents an important legal formant in civil law systems.132   A 
simple example may be found in the development of strict liability rules for things under one’s 
control (fait de choses).  Ostensibly based on art.1242(1) of the Civil Code, the doctrine was 
developed by the courts under the inspiration of scholars such as Josserand who sought to 
respond to social concerns that fault-based liability was proving an inadequate response to 
personal injury cases in the late 19th century.133 Jobin is amongst many who have remarked on 
the richness and abundance of scholarly writing on private law.134   For Helleringer, legal 
scholarship reveals through articles and studies the logic behind the structure of the law (or serves 
indeed to construct such a logic).135 Fundamentally, ‘legal scholarship keeps the codes alive’.136 
Systemisation via codification must therefore be examined in context, reviewing not just the 
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codal provisions themselves, but case-law and legal scholarship. A code will not have the 
precision of a common law statute but, fundamentally, does not set out to do so.   
In the next section, I will contrast codification with common law consolidation. As will 
be seen, despite their differences, both systems utilise a combination of judicial intervention 
and legislation, although differences exist as to the use of informal sources of systemisation.   
 
V. COMMON LAW CONSOLIDATION AND THE LAW OF TORT  
In this section, I will examine the ways in which common lawyers have embraced alternative 
ways of systemising private law and consider their application to the law of tort. Two main 
mechanisms have been utilised: formal means (legislation; judicial precedent) and informal 
means (restatements, scholarly treatises and textbooks). While these may at times be loosely 
labelled ‘codes’, I would strongly argue that such a description is unhelpful and misleading. 
What they represent are alternatives to civilian-style codification and their existence, according 
to legal historians, provides an explanation why England and Wales continued in the 19th 
century to resist calls for codification.137 It is these sources that ‘contributed to the reduction 
of the law into a more orderly and systemic shape.’138  
A. Formal means: Legislation and case law 
1. A partnership 
The ‘common law way’139 towards systemisation has been to embrace a partnership of case-
law and statute. While the most authoritative partner is that of legislation, case law has its own 
systematic force, deriving general principle from specific instances.140 While case-law will, 
based on the doctrine of stare decisis, provide an initial form of judicial systemisation, it is 
supported by piecemeal statutes that consolidate and refine specific areas of law.  In contrast 
to civil law, such statutes do not engage in comprehensive legislation on the whole of private 
or tort law.   Legislation will not generally seek to be all-embracing nor revisit well-established 
fundamental principles.  A notable example of this methodology can be found in the Occupiers’ 
Liability Acts 1957/1984 of England and Wales.  Here the key question - who is an ‘occupier’?  
- is not defined. This is because it has been determined satisfactorily by case-law and so in no 
need of change.141  Equally, while the Defamation Act 2013 does seek to replace certain 
common law defences with statutory versions, in many cases these changes merely consolidate 
existing law142 and the courts continue to rely on principles set out by case-law prior to the 
Act.143 Defamation itself is not defined.144 Similarly, the recent Consumer Rights Act 2015 
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M Lobban and J Moses (eds), The Impact of Ideas on Legal Development (CUP 2012) highlighting the impact 
of informal, in addition to formal, sources.  Braun adds, however, that the late development of negligence law 
may also be a reason why codification was never seriously contemplated in this field: 224. 
138 Braun ibid., 204. 
139 See Lord Wright, ‘The Study of Law’ (1938) 54 LQR 185, 186. 
140 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 560 being the classic example. ‘That courts make law is nowhere more 
obvious than tort law in common law systems, especially in that most open-textured and therefore voracious tort: 
negligence’: Stapleton (n14) 263.   
141 See Wheat v Lacon [1966] AC 552. 
142 See e.g. section 2: Justification and, to a large extent, section 3: honest opinion. 
143 For a recent example, see Serafin v Malkiewicz [2020] UKSC 23; [2020] 1 WLR 2455 on s.4. 





(which consolidated and refined not only UK law, but also selected EU consumer directives) 
does not attempt to legislate on all consumer rights.  Nor does it address established matters 
such as contract formation or breach.  Remedies provided by the statute supplement those 
already existing at common law.145  What is clear about these examples is that they represent a 
partnership between the legislator and the courts. As Lord Burrows has remarked, ‘it is the case 
law that provides the basic legal framework onto which statutes have to be fitted.’146   
Legislation will therefore generally supplement and refine existing case-law.  It can 
provide structure, clarify uncertainty arising from conflicting case law (and undo case-law 
mistakes), and render the law more accessible to its users.  The success of legislation in meeting 
the above goals does, however, vary.  The Defamation Act 2013, for example, seeks to 
modernise the law and respond to concerns that the law had an unduly chilling effect on 
freedom of expression.  However, its consolidation of the ‘serious harm’ test147 and indeed the 
public interest defence based on the earlier Reynolds148 litigation has required clarification by 
case-law at the highest level some five years after the introduction of the Act.149 Equally, case-
law clarification of key sections of the Occupiers’ Liability Acts 1957 and 1984 was needed.150 
Case law therefore supports and ensures the successful operation of the statute: a partnership 
indeed. 
2. Recent attempts to ‘codify’ breach of duty  
In contrast, initiatives for more ‘code-like’ intervention, limiting the role of the courts, have 
not generally worked well in tort. In two recent examples, English and Australian legislators 
sought to legislate on the test for breach of duty in negligence to bring greater certainty and 
predictability to the law. The motivation in both cases was overtly political: in providing 
legislative guidance, the courts would be prevented from applying the test too generously, 
giving rise to too many successful negligence claims.  Legislative intervention thus responded 
to fears that defendants were being over-burdened with claims placing an undue burden on 
their insurers,151  and that the courts were creating a ‘compensation culture’ whereby citizens 
would be discouraged from engaging in socially beneficial behaviour due to the threat of 
litigation.152  Here, what Lunney has termed ‘small-scale codification’153 is being used by the 
legislator to limit the discretion of the courts.  
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In England and Wales, the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 (SARAH) 
identified factors to which the court must have regard in applying the test of breach, namely, 
when relevant, that the person:  
• was acting for the benefit of society or any of its members (s.2);  
• had demonstrated a predominantly responsible approach towards protecting the safety 
or other interests of others (s.3); or 
• had acted heroically by intervening in an emergency to assist an individual in danger 
(s.4). 
No mention is made as to how these factors are to be weighed, but we do know from existing 
tort law that social utility is regarded as a positive factor in the defendant’s favour in 
determining the question of breach.154 As is acting heroically in an emergency.155 In essence, 
then, the Act restates existing law, albeit underlining certain issues that the courts must address, 
one must presume, expressly rather than implicitly.  Hindsight has not been kind to SARAH. 
It has been dismissed by a leading practitioners’ text as having a ‘merely symbolic function’156 
and there has yet to be a single reported case under the statute.  Mulheron, in a devastating 
critique, has suggested that SARAH cannot even be dismissed as relatively harmless in that it 
leaves it to the courts to define key terms such as ‘predominantly responsible’, ‘acting 
heroically’ and ‘for the benefit of society’, creating uncertainty.  Indeed, she speculates, is there 
not a danger that in restating established common law tests one might unwittingly change the 
law?157   
The breach provisions of the Australian Civil Liability Acts equally seek to provide 
greater certainty by setting out in detail the test for breach of duty in negligence.   The Acts are 
the result of a general overhaul of negligence law which followed an insurance crisis in 
Australia in the early 2000s.  The Federal Government responded by commissioning a report 
that made 61 recommendations for legislative reform to the tort of negligence (the Ipp 
Report).158  In reformulating the breach of duty test, the Ipp Report had expressed concern that 
the traditional test set out by Mason J in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt159 had been interpreted 
in a way that allowed the courts to place too much emphasis on foreseeability of risk at the 
expense of the other factors.160  It concluded that it would be helpful ‘to embody the negligence 
calculus in a statutory provision. This might encourage judges to address their minds more 
directly to the issue of whether it would be reasonable to require precautions to be taken against 
a particular risk.’161 Section 5B of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) provides that: 
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(1)  A person is not negligent in failing to take precautions against a risk of harm unless— (a) the risk was 
foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew or ought to have known), and (b) the risk was not 
insignificant, and (c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the person’s position would have taken those 
precautions. 
(2)  In determining whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against a risk of harm, the court is 
to consider the following (amongst other relevant things)— (a) the probability that the harm would occur if care 
were not taken, (b) the likely seriousness of the harm, (c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of 
harm, (d) the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm. 
 
This provision (and its equivalent in other Australian jurisdictions) have raised issues similar 
to those identified in relation to SARAH above. Critics have questioned whether restating an 
established common law test in legislation gives rise to greater certainty or rather might trigger 
unintentional legal change in subsequent court decisions.162  So far it seems that changing the 
risk factor to ‘not insignificant’ (as opposed to ‘not far-fetched or fanciful’ in Shirt) has made 
little impression on the courts.163 This suggests that, like SARAH, s.5B has had no more than 
a symbolic impact on the law.  Even twenty years on, the Australian attempts to ‘codify’ the 
tort of negligence are still ‘bedding in’, with courts, lawyers (and law teachers)164 struggling to 
adapt to the statutory framework.  McDonald, a leading Australian critic, has expressed concern 
that the reforms have brought not certainty, but rather incoherence to the law; a difficulty 
exacerbated by the facts that distinct civil liability legislation now exists across the States and 
Territories of Australia 165  and that the provisions do not cover the whole of the tort of 
negligence.166 
 
3. Legislation and case-law: a successful partnership in tort? 
Legislation in tort can be helpful but given the importance of case-law, a piecemeal approach, 
that seeks to consolidate the law on a specific issue in one place, seems to play more to the 
strengths of the common law system.  More ambitious legislation, as indicated above, faces a 
number of obstacles, not least attracting legislative support and Parliamentary time.  Even 
where this is not a problem, limited Parliamentary perusal and political compromises will often 
need to be addressed subsequently by the courts.  Political imperatives may also result in 
legislation that is poorly drafted (SARAH) or rushed (Australian Civil Liability statutes). 167  
There is also concern that too much legislation will ‘freeze’ the law and render it unable to 
respond to societal change; a real issue as we have seen with the law of tort.168  Piecemeal 
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legislation that consolidates existing law is less likely to do so, permitting incremental case-
law development refining the law on a case-by-case basis.  
This places the baton, however, firmly back with the courts.  In the face of limited 
statutory intervention in tort, it is for the courts to provide general principles of tort law and, at 
apex level, guidance to lower courts via stare decisis.  The problem is that this is not at times 
a role with which the courts feel comfortable.  Numerous examples may be found across private 
law of senior courts resisting calls for systemisation, preferring to defer to Parliament (despite 
the knowledge that Parliament is rarely willing to intervene in tort law).  One notable example 
may be found in relation to negligently incurred psychiatric injury. Here, despite a critical Law 
Commission report,169 the House of Lords refused to intervene to rationalise the law.170  For 
every Robinson (where the UK Supreme Court clarified the duty of care test in negligence),171 
there is a Darnley creating uncertainty as to the scope of a hospital’s duty of care to patients.172  
While the courts at times will step in and resolve a doctrinal dilemma (e.g. clarifying the 
limitation period for intentional torts causing personal injury;173 providing protection against 
misuse of private information174), this is often a sign of frustration at the unwillingness of 
Parliament to intervene and certainly not always the case.175  A reluctance to intervene in 
certain cases combined with limited statutory intervention and, as seen in Section II above, the 
inherent indeterminacy of many aspects of tort law has led to uncertainty and, in some areas of 
tort law, incoherence.  As two former Supreme Court Justices have openly acknowledged, 
‘[m]any aspects of the [common] law of torts are inherently imprecise’.176 
In seeking to minimise such uncertainty in tort law, other sources become important. 
While stare decisis/precedent gives the courts the opportunity to systemise the law, reasoning 
incrementally and by analogy, where the partnership of legislation and case law fails to provide 
sufficient legal clarity and precision, attention must be turned to alternative ways of achieving 
these goals.  
 
B. Informal means: Treatises, Textbooks, Restatements 
If we go back to the 19th century, one reason why codification was not adopted in the 
England and Wales (in contrast to the rest of Europe) was the fact that the systematic 
explanation of the common law was being undertaken, not by codifiers, but by the writers of 
treatises.177 Braun, for example, argues that England during this period developed a type of 
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legal literature that sought to make the common law more coherent and ultimately functioned 
as a substitute for a Code,178 described by Varga as ‘doctrinal codification’.179 For Lord Rodger, 
the existence of excellent textbooks, supported by statutory intervention, offers a convincing 
explanation why codification was deemed unnecessary in common law systems at this time.180 
Goudkamp and Nolan see an evolution – the pioneer treatises of the 19th century followed by 
20th century consolidators.181 Modern private law consolidators include Chitty on Contracts182 
and Clerk and Lindsell on Torts.183 We should also not ignore scholarly textbooks such as 
Winfield and Jolowicz on Torts184  that reach an audience beyond their primary target of 
students to influence the work of practitioners and judges. These works are cited in court and 
their raison d’être is to bring together case-law and legislation to establish a framework of 
reference for those using and applying the law.  Further, the Law Commission of England and 
Wales (established in 1965) represents a body whose work, albeit subject to financial 
constraints, seeks to rationalise, clarify and modernise the law. Even when its recommendations 
are not implemented, they provide a source for reformers and an aide-mémoire for those 
seeking to understand debates in the law.185    
Yet, the logical question is why these resources have to date had limited impact on the 
common law courts.  This contrasts with the position in civil law identified above where 
codification is supported by judicial interpretation and scholarly commentary. It is trite simply 
to respond that the practice of the common law courts is make limited reference to academic 
authority. Law Commission reports and practitioners’ texts are frequently cited and at times 
used as a framing device. Equally, senior judges have increasingly been willing to acknowledge 
the utility of academic articles.186  The issue appears to be one of legitimacy.  Courts remain 
wary of intervention on the basis of informal initiatives lacking the status of legislative 
intervention.  Even Law Commission proposals recommending much needed reform to areas 
of tort law such as psychiatric injury187 and limitation188  have been left to Parliament to 
consider. The question, therefore, is how to persuade the courts that certain informal sources 
of systemisation are worthy of consideration. The success of even the best projects lies with 
 
Private Wrongs (Little, Brown & Co 1859) and T Addison, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or Wrongs and their 
Remedies (Stevens & Sons 1860). 
178 Braun (n137) 219.  
179 Varga (n36) 161. 
180 A Rodger, ‘The codification of commercial law in Victorian England’ (1992) 108 LQR 570, 589. 
181  J Goudkamp and D Nolan, ‘Pioneers, consolidators and iconoclasts: The story of tort scholarship’ in J 
Goudkamp and D Nolan (eds), Scholars of Tort Law (Hart 2019). They acknowledge that this division is not 
water-tight e.g. Fleming’s nine editions of The Law of Torts have been described as a short treatise: 19. 
182 H Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts (33rd edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2019). 
183 Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (n156). 
184 J. Goudkamp and D. Nolan, Winfield and Jolowicz on Torts (20th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2020).  Note also 
R. Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law (2nd edn, CUP 2020) whose ambitious textbook seeks to tease out general 
principles of tort law. 
185  The Commission also benefits from membership drawn from academia and practice. The Chair of the 
Commission is either a High Court or an Appeal Court judge, appointed by the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of 
State for Justice for up to three years. 
186 See, for example, Lord Neuberger in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42; [2017] AC 467, para 170; Australian 
Chief Justice, S Kiefel, ‘The academy and the courts: What do they mean to each other today?’ Australian 
Academy of Law Patron’s Address, Brisbane, 31 October 2019.    
187 Law Commission Report n°249, Liability for Psychiatric Illness (1998).  





the willingness of courts and legislators to respond to recommendations that will systemise and 
clarify the law.   
One possible response is to provide a restatement of the key principles of tort law.  
Andrews argues that a succinct restatement of law can have three benefits: accessibility 
(making the law easier to discover and communicate), making the law more susceptible to 
rational discussion and consistency (rendering the law more likely to be applied consistently 
by lawyers).189  Restatements represent an attempt by scholars and practitioners to systemise 
the law in a new, more accessible form, concentrating on its most important principles, 
supported by commentary and evidence of state practice. Like a code, restatements address 
broad areas of law (contract, tort, restitution).190  They are not subject to the constraints of 
parliamentary time that render statutory intervention into private law relatively rare.  Here the 
influence of the American Law Institute (ALI) is pivotal.191  Founded as a private institution in 
1923 in response to the perceived uncertainty and complexity of American law, its members 
include judges, practitioners and academics of international renown.  One of the ALI's first 
projects was to restate the law of torts in 1934, with the second full restatement in 1965. More 
recently, areas of tort law that have undergone considerable change since 1965 have been 
subject to a third restatement.192 While non-binding and purely advisory, in the US they are 
consulted by both judges and attorneys and provide a very useful overview in a federal system 
with different state laws.  They also provide a source of inspiration for state legislators.   
Lord Burrows in 2016 sought to transplant the restatement into English contract law. 
In his A Restatement of the English Law of Contract,193  supported by an advisory group of 20 
including 10 judges and practitioners and 10 scholars,194  Burrows endeavoured to set out the 
law ‘in as clear and accessible a form as possible’ and provide the ‘best interpretation of the 
present English law of contract’.195  In adopting the US Restatement style - stating legal 
principles, followed by a full commentary explaining the Restatement’s provisions and 
allowing readers to see its application in real and hypothetical cases –his work represents an 
informal attempt to consolidate existing law.  The style is notably closer to that of a common 
law statute rather than a civilian code.196  Cambridge professor Neil Andrews published a 
similar project that same year, albeit acting alone, based on, in his words, a decade trying to 
explain English law to civil lawyers.197  Andrews’ model provides 198 Rules in 24 Parts 
(including five General Principles),198 each article supported by Comment and Further Reading 
with references to leading cases, statutes and specialist literature.  It is, as one commentator 
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remarked, 199 an ambitious undertaking, seeking to encourage the adoption of English common 
law as the law of choice in the world of economic business. Both address the same audience of 
practitioners, the judiciary, academics and students.  
 Albeit focused on contract law, such projects throw light on the potential utility of 
restatements of private law, but also some of the difficulties.   Burrows noted several issues in 
undertaking his project.  First, how to deal with gaps or uncertainty in the law.  While seeking 
merely to explain current law, he found it hard to avoid taking a policy position in such 
instances and noted that they often gave rise to strong differences of opinion between members 
of the advisory group. It is difficult to ‘restate’ unsettled law.  All one can give is an overview 
of different views and a suggestion for a way forward.  Second, how to determine the degree 
to which a restatement should include statutory provisions and deal with general matters of 
principle as opposed to specific issues relating to different types of contract.  Andrews 
(understandably) also flagged the challenges of undertaking such an endeavour alone even for 
a very experienced and eminent scholar. Their aim is to provide a useful additional tool for 
those seeking to understand the shape and form of private law, albeit, in terms of legitimacy, a 
restatement produced by a team of experts is likely to have more force than that of a single 
scholar and statements of policy will depend on the expertise and eminence of the authors. 200  
Lord Leggatt in his review of Burrows’ work contrasted restatements (such as those 
discussed above) that are largely descriptive and seek to make existing law more accessible, 
with restatements that set out a model law stating best practice and seeking to influence 
lawmakers. 201   While seeking inspiration from the US Restatements, restatements at a 
European level have tended to reflect this latter approach.202  For example, the Principles of 
European Tort Law (PETL)203 were drafted by academics from across the EU with the goal of 
providing greater coherence to private law by drafting a set of unifying principles.  These 
principles represent the ‘best’ solutions for an European law of torts rather than a restatement 
of existing legal practice.204 While such principles, drafted in the civil law style, have inevitably 
found greater favour with civil, rather than common, law jurisdictions,205 they (in common 
with other attempts, such as the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)206 and work of 
the Study Group on a European Civil Code (SGECC)207) are collaborative works that combine 
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draft model rules with comments and references to case-law, legislation and literature and have 
received funding at a national and European level.  They mirror attempts to harmonise 
principles of European contract law.208  The aim here is to identify a ‘soft’ European tort law, 
rather than simply making existing law more accessible.  As such, such examples play a more 
overtly political role in harmonising tort principle across the EU, including, as the work of the 
SGECC indicates, the prospect of a European Civil Code.209 
Examining the models above, it is clear that a restatement that is descriptive rather than 
setting out model rules will have more utility for a common law system.  The issue here is not 
a political one of bridging national laws encompassing distinct legal cultures, languages and 
socio-economic structures, but rather one that seeks to systemise existing law in a more 
accessible and coherent way.  Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the reason why 
restatements have proven popular in the US is that they (as in Europe) have responded to 
divergence within a federal structure between the private laws of individual states.  This gives 
rise to an institutional need for such instruments.  This is not, however, the case in most 
common law jurisdictions which serves to explain the lack of interest (notably in terms of 
financing) for such initiatives. Given (as stated in Section II) the evolving nature of tort law, 
the need for flexibility to respond to societal change and the input of the courts, it becomes 
understandable why, to date, there has been no English attempt at a restatement of tort law. 
Even the contract law initiatives outlined above have had limited impact.  Any restatement of 
torts would need both to be regularly updated and highlight active doctrinal debates.  One might 
wonder, for example, about the longevity of a restatement of the principles of vicarious liability 
given the rapidity of recent case-law developments, unless it was stated in a very general 
way.210  Further, as Burrows discovered, even explanatory summaries of the law cannot avoid 
matters of policy and decisions as to scope. This is particularly true of the law of tort.  
One is left with the conclusion that despite the initial attractiveness of the restatement 
project, it would require investment, a mixture (as in the Burrows’ project) of legal personnel 
and regular updating.  This author is not surprised therefore that efforts have primarily been 
directed to less controversial and more predictable areas of law such as contract law.  It would 
also be an immense endeavour - any restatement would have to include not only rules but 
commentary and relevant literature.   
This takes us back, then, to the start of this section.  Just as civilian codification is 
supplemented by case-law and scholarship, the common law partnership (case-law + 
legislation) would benefit from assistance to improve systemisation.  At present, legal 
scholarship does supplement to a certain extent formal sources of law, but, in the absence of 
any viable restatement project, it is worth considering why such informal sources have failed 
to have the influence seen in civil law systems.  The answer, as will be seen in the next section, 
lies in the nature of the scholarship concerned.  As Stapleton has commented, scholarship that 
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is sensitive to the nature of judicial decision-making and the constitutional restraints within 
which the judiciary operate will be best placed to influence the courts.211 
 
VII. SYSTEMISATION AND THE LAW OF TORT   
 
Tort law is prone to uncertainty.212 As Lord Neuberger commented recently, ‘tort law reflects 
most aspects of human life … consequently no set of principles can satisfactorily cover every 
situation in which a claim in tort, even in a particular tort, is brought.’213 The question is how 
to minimise such uncertainty and render tort law more accessible, intelligible, clear and 
predictable.  This paper has discussed civilian-style codification and common law 
consolidation as means of systemisation.  Examination of the French proposals to recodify tort 
law reveals what codification can achieve, but also what it cannot.  Codification permits 
updating and consolidation of material previously outside the Code which aids accessibility. It 
facilitates new initiatives reflecting changing priorities in the law of tort. It also allows a 
discussion of tort law as a whole – its aims, objectives, its role in society. What it does not 
provide is a one-stop-shop nor a detailed exposition of the law.  While the 2017 Projet de 
réforme has flaws – it is over-ambitious at times, introducing concepts such as l’amende civile 
for which there is no general support, and it would have been helpful to clarify the meaning of 
disputed terms such as ‘causation’ or ‘dommage’ - at heart, it seeks to clarify and systemise 
tort law principle and bring back into the civil code two hundred years of case-law which arose 
as a result of the very limited provision made for tort law in the Code civil of 1804.  This is to 
be welcomed. It is important, however, to flag that systemisation by codification is only the 
start.  Case-law and legal commentary will explore further the meaning of the revised Civil 
Code.   
In foregoing codification and adopting consolidation by legislation supplementing 
judicial development via stare decisis, the common law has similar goals.  As this article has 
shown, attempts to limit judicial legal development by ‘codifying’ elements of the common 
law have not proven particularly successful in tort.  Problems arise, however, where judges are 
unwilling to systemise the law and Parliament refuses to intervene. Such reluctance may be 
understandable in terms of the separation of powers, with judges unwilling openly to engage 
with matters of policy they believe best addressed by the legislature, but this has contributed 
to the lack of precision and coherence found in many areas of common law tort law.  
This leads to three conclusions. First, common lawyers are correct to reject codification 
as a means of resolving tort law uncertainty.  It does not reflect current common law practice 
and, as the French example has shown, at best, a code can establish a framework – a focus – 
bringing key rules together.  A better approach would be to improve the existing system. 
Second, neither codification nor consolidation are sole actors but operate with the support of 
case-law.  This form of intervention is vital to ensure that the particular needs of tort law – in 
terms of flexibility and receptiveness to social and political change – are achieved. Thirdly, 
one issue highlighted in this paper is the different influence of legal scholarship in civil and 
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common law jurisdictions.  In France, la doctrine is regarded as having a status almost 
equivalent to a source of law.  There is also a long-standing tradition of civil law commentaries 
on codified private law (e.g. Palandt, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch Kommentar for Germany;214 
Tramontano, Codice civile for Italy) 215  which bear some resemblance to the restatement 
projects.  In contrast, restatements, as we have seen, have not found favour in common law 
systems bar the US (provoked, as we have stated, by a federal system of state private law) and 
a few academic initiatives.  In the absence of a need to harmonise (or achieve an overview) of 
competing state laws, this is unlikely to change.   
 What does this mean for tort law systemisation? Codification can improve the 
accessibility, intelligibility, clarity and predictability of tort law, but its generality will require 
support from case-law and legal commentary to ensure its longevity and adaptability to 
changing social and political climates.  Consolidating statutes play a similar role, albeit 
different in style, and the detail and complexity of common law statutory drafting can often 
prove a barrier to flexibility and adaptability.  This may explain why such statutes are relatively 
rare in the law of torts and that case-law is regarded as better serving the need for flexibility 
and adaptability.  This does, however, present a problem.  Parliamentary Sovereignty dictates 
that legislative intervention will be the ‘best’ solution, having the benefit of legitimacy and 
democratic choice. As Cane argues, if done properly, legislation acts as a more pluralistic and 
open agent of norm-legalisation than case-law.216  However, democratic concern must accept 
that, in a common-law system, courts are expected to develop the law and, in the view of Priel, 
those that fail to do so may be seen as abdicating responsibilities allotted to them.217 Here, 
assistance may be gained from informal sources.  While traditionally the common law has been 
wary of relying on scholarship, it is submitted that informal sources may provide an intellectual 
framework that can help systemise and clarify the law and their utility needs to be recognised.  
This requires, however, a particular kind of legal scholarship. I have mentioned treatises and 
textbooks above, but to this may be added any form of scholarship that is directed, not in the 
abstract, but as to how courts decide cases and which is sensitive to the nature of judicial 
decision-making. An interesting comparison may be made with civil law systems where notes 
d’arrêt218  and Kommentare written by professors and practitioners provide exactly this kind 
of practical scholarship. 219  As Burrows’ interesting project highlights, work based on 
collaborative exercises, bringing together the expertise of lawyer, judge and the academic, 
appears most likely to provide material useful to a court.220 This will require rethinking, not 
solely by the judiciary, but also by academics in considering how they orientate their work. 
While common law research funding has tended to draw academics away from such 
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scholarship, 221  it remains the case that courts are most likely to respond to work directed at a 
judicial audience which assists them in the systematic development of the law. While greater 
recognition of the value of such work is needed, far more support is needed for those 
undertaking such work than exists at present.  
 Common and civil law systems employ different means to systemise the modern law 
of tort. This comparative study has highlighted the role that can be played by both formal and 
informal mechanisms in improving the accessibility, clarity and coherence of tort law.  No 
system is perfect.  Tort law continues to defy any attempt to confine it to a single code or 
consolidating statute.  Yet this article argues that mechanisms do exist to enhance the 
systemisation of tort law and minimise uncertainty – be it improving an existing codification 
or recognising to a greater extent the utility of legal scholarship attuned to judicial needs.  These 
mechanisms need to be considered seriously. Complacency should not be an option.   
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